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Advertising Legalized Gambling: 
A Late Bloomer 
Under the First Amendment 
by 
Larry D. Strate 
New federal laws and court cases have put a new perspective on the 
ability of the industry to advertise as it has never been able to do 
before. With gaming becoming more prevalent, the acceptability of 
the legal industry is making promotion easier. The author discusses 
these new influences. 
What do Edge Broadcasting Co. u. U.S.l, the Charity Games 
Advertising Clarification Act,2 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act 3 have in common? 
Separately, they impact the issues of regulating gambling adver- 
tising by virtue of being either persuasive federal case law or federal 
statute which allows legal, privately-run, or charitable activities the 
same advertising rights as state-conducted lotteries. ngether they 
represent the threshold entry into the 21st Century in the continu- 
ing attempt to balance the interests of those seeking to advertise 
legalized gambling and those seeking to reduce it. 
The magnitude of gaming in America, a multi-billion dollar leisure 
time industry, is impressive. That industry is disseminated among 49 
states that offer some forms of gaming. Some 39 states allow interstate 
betting on horse races: or presently conduct or have legalized lotterie~.~ 
Some 75 Indian tribes in 20 states operate 150 gaming halls5 
The definition of gambling is a matter of individual state interpre- 
tation; even the forums of legalized are varied. They include, but are 
not limited to, casino gambling, lotteries, card rooms, cruise ship gam- 
ing, floating river casinos, parimutuel wagering, progressive slots, 
Indian reservation gaming, multi-casino computer-linked gaming sys- 
tems, patron slot clubs, sports book facilities, video gaming, high-tech 
slot machines, bingo parlors, horse racing, and dog racing. 
The spread of gambling is not limited to the coastal states; 
America's heartland also has gambling. Illinois is expected to begin via 
riverboat gambling; applications have been filed for gaming on the 
Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois, Des Plaines, and Fox  river^.^ Indiana 
approved a bill that would allow casino gambling in Gary, French Lick, 
and West Baden Springs,' and Iowa approved gambling on the 
Mississippi. Louisiana introduced riverboat gambling.8 Missouri has 
approved a bill authorizing riverboat gambling on the Mississippi and 
Missouri rivers, subject to voter appr~val.~ Casino ships are allowed to 
operate out of the Gulf Coast in international waters.1° Pennsylvania 
recently passed a bill authorizing riverboat gambling." South Dakota 
began gambling in Deadwood in November 1989, with slot machines, 
blackjack, and poker.12 A constitutional amendment would be neces- 
sary if Wis~onsin'~ were to adopt gaming. Even Nevada has changed. 
In 1991, the Nevada legislature amended its 1864 constitution to 
authorize the operation of charitable lotteries.14 
The acceptability of gaming extends beyond the shores of the 
United States. There is an increased interest in gaming-related ven- 
tures throughout South America, the Caribbean, the Eastern bloc 
countries of Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as Sweden, 
Norway, and Finland, with continued expansion in Canada and New 
Zealand.15 "International gaming at  a glance," published in Gaming 
& Wagering Business, lists 68 countries in addition to the United 
States which permit activities such as bingo, cock fighting, casinos, 
greyhounds, horseracing, jai-alai, lottery, pools, off-track betting, slot 
machines, and others.16 
The changing technology in the communications industry has 
contributed to the spread and popularity of gambling as "broadcast 
signals, as a technological matter, which cannot be confined to politi- 
cal boundaries."" The future of gaming and wagering may include 
interactive television shows and telephone betting. 
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the 
Communications Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.; 21 U.S.C.; 47 U.S.C. 35, 151) 
to regulate interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio, 
reflecting the changing technology. It was assigned additional regula- 
tory jurisdiction via the provisions of the Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962 (47 U.S.C. 701-744). Its scope now includes radio and tele- 
vision broadcasting; telephone, telegraph, cable television, two-way 
radio, and radio operators; and satellite communication. 
Lottery Statute Dates to 1892 
When the lottery statute was enacted in 1892, it was assumed 
that the government had virtually unlimited authority to regulate 
the content of commercial advertising. The purpose of the original 
federal lottery statute-18 U.S.C. #1304, and 1307-was to prevent 
the advertising of fraud in games of chance, pyramid schemes, fake 
drawings, and other confidence games. The pertinent section of the 
lottery statute reads in part: 
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a 
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoev- 
er, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broad- 
casting of, and advertisement of or information concerning 
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme ... shall be fined 
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both ...I8 
Corresponding regulations are also contained in 47 C.F.R. part 
73.1211. Those regulations state that the FCC ... "may revoke any 
station license ... for the violation of section 1304." An additional 
statute also provides for a civil or forfeiture penalty not to exceed 
$1,000 in the event of a section 1304 violation.lg 
Reflecting the tenor of time, an early U.S. Supreme Court opin- 
ion reasoned as follows: 
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling 
are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with 
the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are con- 
fined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the 
whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every 
class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor, and it plun- 
ders the ignorant and simple.20 
The restrictions contained in the U.S. Code, intending to stifle 
the threat of fraudulent enterprises via criminal and civil penal- 
ties (including jail sentences and fines), applied to those individu- 
als considered nefarious. I t  also applied to any other person 
operating a lottery or wagering, such as a church, or philanthropic 
organization. 
Lotteries and bingo have been authorized in many states for 
church groups, charities and other qualified nonprofit organi- 
zations. Currently, advertising and detailed information con- 
cerning these fundraising activities cannot be broadcast or 
distributed by newspapers send by mail or out-of-state by 
other means. This significantly decreases the revenues that 
church and charitable organizations raise. 
It is incongruous that the Congress, at  a time when churches 
and charities in the private sector are increasingly assuming the 
burden of many social programs, should stand in the way of those 
states which have made a policy determination that churches and 
charities can use lotteries and raffles as a means of raising desper- 
ately-needed revenues.21 
The inability of the industry to advertise has been a problem for 
the legitimate gambling interests in the United States for a long 
time. What has been a problem for the gaming industry has not nec- 
essarily been a problem for other legitimate businesses in the United 
States. As recently as 1984, before a U.S. Senate subcommittee hear- 
ing in Washington, D.C., the dilemma facing the gaming industry 
was summed in testimony: 
It is important to remember, however, that the gaming industry 
is but one segment of the growing entertainment/ leisure time 
indust ry... We are not asking for special treatment, but rather 
we are asking for equal treatment. We would like to be able to 
compete with others for the entertainment dollar." 
FCC Can Enforce Prohibitions 
The FCC was empowered to enforce the prohibitions on broadcast 
information on lotteries, and issued regulations prohibiting broadcast- 
ers from carrying advertisements of or information concerning any lot- 
tery, gift enterprise, or similar schemez3 
The FCC interpreted those prohibitions to include all forms of 
gambling, while the Department of Justice and the Postal Service 
either limited the prohibition to illegal lotteries or questioned the con- 
stitutionality of the laws themselves. Confusion seemed to reign 
because of the inconsistency of FCC interpretation, because it seemed 
to vary depending on who was doing the inter~reting.'~ Legislative his- 
tory indicated Congress meant to only limit lotteries, whether legal or 
illegal. They apparently did not intend to limit lotteries by charity, but 
their good wishes were swept aside by the poorly-worded statute.25 
The only exception to the otherwise sweeping ban on gaming 
advertising was created in 1975 as 18 U.S.C. #1307, which permits 
state-run lotteries to advertise in the state holding the game and in 
adjacent states that themselves conduct lotteries. 
In 1984, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate held hearings appropriately entitled "Modernizing Federal 
Restrictions on Gaming Advertising." Despite being sponsored by an 
influential Nevada Republican who chaired the Judiciary's Criminal 
Law Subcommittee, S. 1876 - S. Rept. 98-537 advanced no fkther.26 Its 
recommendations would serve as a forerunner to the Charity Games 
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988." 
The committee observed the drastic changes from the time when 
lotteries and gambling activities were privately run and unregulated, 
to a time 100 years later when almost all states authorized some form 
of lottery or gambling activity. In the interest of fairness, legal private- 
ly-run or charitable activities should enjoy the same rights as state- 
conducted lotteries. 
Carving another exemption into the old law, this new statute 
allows advertising in interstate commerce of all legal lotteries, gift 
enterprises, and similar activities. The bill removes federal restrictions 
on the advertising of legitimate lotteries and gambling activities in 
interstate commerce, whether conducted by public, private, or charita- 
ble interests.28 
No attempt was made to limit the rights of the individual states to 
restrict such advertising under state law. In fact, there was a delay 
mechanism in order to allow each state time to enact legislation to pro- 
hibit this type of advertising within the boundaries of an individual 
state. The committee made it very clear that illegal gambling activities 
were not to be advertised. 
In the memorandum on the final compromise, because almost all 
states authorized some form of lottery or gambling activity, the com- 
rnittee concluded that the federal government "should not necessarily 
restrict the free flow of information about such lawful activitie~."~~ 
Indian Gaming Regulation Is Issue 
The next federal statute represented a new frontier for gaming 
-that of Indian reservations and gambling. The development of 
gaming on Indian lands is not surprising as gaming has become 
more prevalent. Current estimates of revenue generated on Indian 
lands are over $ 1 billion. Some 300 Indian tribes have 108 gambling 
facilities on Indian lands within the states' geographical boundaries, 
and, of those, 104 have bingo, 93 pull-tabs or punch card games, four 
casino gambling, and 15 other gambling activities3' 
The regulation of Indian lands has generally been the province 
of the U.S. Congress. The regulation of gaming-related activities has 
traditionally been considered within each state's general police 
power. Although social attitudes and legal proscriptions regarding 
gambling have seemingly eased in the intervening century, the 
desire of a state to regulate gambling is still respected by the courts.31 
But because of the potential source of revenue available from gam- 
bling on Indian lands, Indian tribes, states, federal regulatory agen- 
cies, Congress, and the court system have been on a collision course.32 
The state of California wanted to regulate the Cabazon Indian 
bingo games, as did the county of Riverside. In 1987, the decision in 
State of California v. Cabazon Indians33 barred states from regulat- 
ing Indian gaming. 
The holding by the Court was in keeping with its precedents 
regarding sovereignty, that Indian tribes retain "attributes of sover- 
eignty over both their members and their territory"34 and that "tribal 
sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal gov- 
ernment, not the states."35 
With judicial fuel added to the volatile issue, the collision of 
interests culminated when seven proposals to regulate gaming on 
Indian lands were introduced into the 99th Congress. It was the 
100th Congressional session that  passed the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act. The issues which Congress sought to resolve with 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act included the practical resolution 
to the legitimate competing concerns of tribal sovereignty, state bur- 
den, and federal interest, as well as how states like Nevada, with a 
regulated gaming industry, can function with potentially unregulat- 
ed casino gambling either near or next to existing regulated games.36 
The act created a three-tiered system whereby tribes would con- 
trol ceremonial games, the federal government would control bingo, 
and the state and tribes would negotiate agreements to cover casino 
games, parimutuel racing, and jai-alai, if such games were legal in 
that particular state. 
According to Anthony J. Hop, chairman of the National Indian 
Gaming Commission, there are some 150 gambling halls operated by 
75 tribes in 20 states, most for bingo, with a combined gross revenue 
of $1 billion a year.37 Since the 1988 law was enacted, 16 casino gam- 
bling compacts have been reached in five states, but most of the casi- 
nos have not yet opened. More than  a dozen other tribes in 
Washington, New York, Arizona, New Mexico, Florida, Mississippi, 
and Nevada are negotiating similar compacts.3s 
An important aspect to the development of gaming on Indian 
reservations has to do with restrictions on advertising. There are 
none. Any form of gambling available in the state may be offered, 
and Indians are not bound by any federal or state criminal codes lim- 
iting the use of mail, broadcast television, or telephone. As an exam- 
ple, satellite MegaBingo quickly lined up over 20 reservations for its 
guaranteed $500,000 prize game.39 
Putting policy questions aside, the last two decades of judicial 
determination have held that commercial speech is under the protec- 
tion of the First Amendment, even though to a lesser extent than 
that protection extended to non-commercial speech. Notwithstanding 
the Department of Justice's observation that these judicial decisions 
"cast serious doubt upon the enf~rceability"~" of federal criminal 
statutes prohibiting the mailing or broadcasting of advertisements . 
and information concerning lawful gaming enterprises, the statutes 
need modification to conform to the mandates of First Amendment 
commercial speech case law. 
Several Cases Impact the Advertising of Gaming 
A series of cases begun in 1975 have extended protection of the 
First Amendment to commercial speech. In 1978 Justice Scalia wrote 
that commercial speech enjoys "a limited measure of protection, com- 
mensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might 
be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.'"' 
Justice White wrote in 1968: "Broadcasting is clearly a medium 
affected by a First Amendment interest.'"' The Supreme Court indicated 
that Congress possesses greater latitude to regulate broadcasting than 
other forms of communication. Justice Marshall observed in 1983: "Our 
decisions have recognized that the special interest of the federal govern- 
ment in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into 
a justification for regulation of other means of co~nmunication."~~ 
In a 1970 case, the Supreme Court specifically extended to radio 
coverage the power of Congress constitutionally to restrict the inter- 
state dissemination of lottery materials recognized in Ex parte 
Rapier, 143 U.S. 133,12 S.Ct. 374,36 L.Ed. 93 (1892). 
Nearly a century ago in Ex parte Rapier,44 Congress enacted a 
complete ban on the importation, mailing, and advertisement of lot- 
teries, and extended that  prohibition to broadcasting by the 
Communications Act of 1934.45 
Bigelow v. Virginia46 is the first case of major interest to legal 
gambling. Bigelow involved an advertisement for abortion services 
available in New York which was placed in a Virginia publication. 
New York had chosen to legalize abortions and was advertising that 
fact. However, Virginia had not only decided to outlaw abortions, but 
it passed a statute prohibiting the publication of any information 
about abortions. The Supreme Court struck down the state law, hold- 
ing the abortion advertisement protected by the First Amendment. 
A second major breakthrough came in a 1976 case. For the first 
time the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protects 
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. In 
Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer the 
Court struck down state restrictions on price advertising by pharma- 
cists as unconstitutional. 
The next two cases followed quickly: Carey v. Population Services 
International 48 struck down a ban on any "advertisement or display" of 
contraceptives, and Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public 
Services Cornmi~s ion~~ involved promotional advertising by utilities. 
Supreme Court Covers Commercial Speech 
The Supreme Court explained its reasons for expanding protec- 
tions of the First Amendment to cover commercial speech. The Court 
"rejected the highly paternalistic view that government has complete 
power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. People will per- 
ceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, 
and the best means to that end is to open the channels of communi- 
cations, rather than to close them."50 
While commercial advertising is entitled to less protection under 
the First Amendment than non-commercial speech, it nonetheless 
has been afforded significant First Amendment safeguards since it 
"not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists 
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible 
dissemination of informati~n."~' 
In a prelude to the case enunciating a four-part analysis for 
determining the constitutionality of a restriction on commercial 
speech, Zaurder v. Office of Disciplinary C o u n ~ e l , ~ ~  the Supreme 
Court insisted that a state must identify a direct link between the 
interest asserted and the regulation a t  issue. "Commercial speech 
that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activi- 
ty. ..may be restricted only in the service of substantial governmen- 
tal interest, and only through means that directly advance the 
interest." The Court concluded: "But as we stated above, broad 
prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the protections 
afforded commercial speech are to retain their force."53 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric C~rp . , ' ~  Justice Powell enunci- 
ated that traditional four-part analysis for determining the constitu- 
tionality of a restriction on commercial speech: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial free 
speech to come within the provision, it must at least concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether 
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces- 
sary to serve the interest.55 
Four-Part Test Provides Framework 
This four-part test has been accepted as the analytical framework 
for determining the constitutionality of restrictions upon commercial 
speech.56 This test was used in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. 
Tourism Co.? where the Court dealt with the ability of the legislature 
to allow the advertising of casino gambling directed toward tourists, 
yet prohibited similar advertising toward residents. 
The threshold determination was whether or not the advertising 
concerned a lawful activity, and was not misleading. The gaming was a 
lawful activity and not mi~leading.~' The next step was to determine 
whether the Puerto Rican government's interest in reducing the 
demand for casino gambling by residents was related to the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens. The second test was valid.59 
The third part of the test was whether or not the challenged 
restrictions directly advanced the government's interest. Advertising 
of casino gambling aimed at  the residents of Puerto Rico would tend 
to increase the demand for the product advertised. The third test 
was reasonable.'jO 
The fourth part of the test was whether the restrictions were no 
more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest. 
The narrow construction announced by the Puerto Rican court via 
legislative fiat would not affect the advertising of casino gambling 
aimed at  tourists, but would apply to such advertising only when 
aimed at the residents of the Commonwealth. The restrictions were 
held to be no more extensive than necessary.'jl 
The legislative history of the Puerto Rican Act reads as follows: 
Excessive casino gambling among residents ... would produce 
serious harmful effects on the health, safety, and welfare of 
the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and 
cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of 
prostitution, the development of corruption and the infiltra- 
tion of organized crime. [Brief for Appellee 33.1 
This is the same legislature that sought to protect horseracing, 
cockfighting, "picas" or small games of chance at  fiestas, and the lot- 
tery on the grounds that they had been traditionally part of Puerto 
Rican roots. 
It is important to note the impressive dissenting opinions. Justice 
Brennan, in his minority opinion, flatly stated: "I do not believe that 
Puerto Rico constitutionally may suppress truthful commercials engag- 
ing in lawful activity. While tipping its hat to these standards, the 
Court does little more than defer to what it perceives to be the determi- 
nation by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on casino advertising 
aimed at  residents is reasonable." The Court totally ignored the fact 
that commercial speech is entitled to substantial First Amendment pro- 
tection, giving the government unprecedented authority to eviscerate 
constitutionally-protected expression." Justice Brennan described 
Posadas as "dramatically shrinking the scope of First Amendment pro- 
tection available to commercial speech.'"j3 
An equally strong dissent was written by Justice Stevens: 
Whether a State may ban all advertising of an activity that it 
permits but could prohibit-such as gambling, prostitution, or 
the consumption of marijuana or liquor-is an elegant ques- 
tion of constitutional law. It is not, however, appropriate to 
address that  question in this case because Puerto Rico's 
rather bizarre restraints on speech are so apparently forbid- 
den by the First Amendment.64 
In 1989, another case addressed the more specific issue of the 
fourth part of the Central Hudson test, whether or not government 
restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the 
least restrictive means to achieve the desired end. In Board of 
Dustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,65 the Court decid- 
ed that the least restrictive means test is no longer applicable. 
The least restrictive test is not to be applied in the determination 
of the validity of restrictions on commercial speech under the free 
speech provisions of the Constitution's First Amendment. The Court 
reasoned that commercial speech enjoys a limited measure of protec- 
tion commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might 
be impermissible in the realm of non-commercial expression. The 
ample scope of regulatory authority suggested by such doctrines would 
be illusory under a least-restrictive-means requirement, and while the 
free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify 
imposing on would-be regulators the cost of distinguishing the harm- 
less from the harmful, prior cases have not imposed the burden of 
demonstrating that the distinguishing is 100 percent complete, or by 
the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will 
achieve the desired ends; instead, what is required is a fit between the 
legislature's ends and the means closest to accomplish those ends that 
is not necessarily perfectly reasonable, or represents not necessarily 
the single best disposition, but one whose scope is in proportion to the 
interests served, and employs not necessarily the least restrictive 
means, but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective 
within such bounds. It is for governmental decision makers to judge 
what manner of regulation may best be employed; the narrowly-tai- 
lored-means test is not overly permissive of government regulat i~n.~~ 
Current Cases Explore Restrictions 
Edge Broadcasting Corporation [Edge], with its principal place 
of business in Virginia, operated WMYK-FM (aka Power 94), 
licensed by the FCC, and broadcasting from Moyock, North Carolina. 
Power 94 is one of 24 commercial radio stations serving the 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area. 
The State of North Carolina does not sponsor a lottery and its 
statutes make participating in and the advertising of non-exempt 
raffles and lotteries a misdemeanor.'j7 The Commonwealth of 
Virginia, however, does authorize a lottery, and since 1988 has con- 
ducted lottery games.68 
Edge challenges the constitutionality of the two provisions of the 
federal lottery statute, as well as seeks clarification of its position of 
liability in North Carolina. 
According to one survey, approximately 92.2 percent of the popu- 
lation of the listening audience reside in Virginia and 7.89 percent 
reside in North Carolina.'j9 Virginia authorizes a lottery. Edge esti- 
mates that it derives more the 95 percent of its local advertising rev- 
enues from sources in the State of Virginia, but fearful of being 
subject to criminal or civil penalties, it has not broadcast any adver- 
tisements promoting the Virginia lottery. As a result, it estimates 
lost advertising revenue in the millions of dollars. For example, in 
1988, Virginia paid $1,285,141 in media advertising; in 1989 expen- 
ditures were estimated at  $2,300,000.70 Advertising space was also 
purchased in the area's two largest newspapers, both of which circu- 
late in the North Carolina counties also reached by Power 94's sig- 
nal. It was estimated that 75 percent of all television viewing in 
these same nine counties is directed to Virginia television stations 
which carry lottery ad~ertising.~' 
Utilizing the four-part Central Hudson test, and incorporating 
Board of Dustees of SUAWs test- "a narrowly tailored-means test," 
Edge Broadcasting Co. v. U.S.'?efleds current First Amendment pro- 
tection of commercial speech based on the information function of 
advertising, the social recognition that '%roadcast signals, as a techno- 
logical matter, cannot be confined to political boundaries'773 as American 
habits show that adults spend 29 percent of their media consumption 
listening to the radio and 60 percent watching tele~ision.~~ 
Commercial Speech Must Be Informational 
The principle that the First Amendment's concern for commercial 
speech is based on the informational function of advertising is the focal 
point of the first part of the Central Hudson 75 test. It examines whether 
the activity spoken of its la*, and whether the information imparted 
is truthful. "There can be no constitutional objection to the suppression 
of commercial messages that does not accurately inform the public 
about lawful a~tivity."~~ The legality of advertising about the Virginia 
lottery was undisputed. It was lawfully created by the state's voters in a 
November 3,1987, referendum and established by Virginia.77 
The second part of the test is concerned with the substantiality 
of government intent. The interest served by Sections 1304 and 1307 
is the furtherance of fundamental interest of federalism enabling 
non-lottery states to discourage gambling.78 These interests are simi- 
lar to other "substantial" interests which have been accepted as com- 
plying with Central Hudson's second standard. For example, a state 
statutory prohibition of liquor advertising-a restriction designed to 
reduce consumption of alcohol-has been upheld,ig and a state law 
restriction on utility advertising designed to reduce energy consump- 
tion has been recognized as valid." Congress may assist states in 
inhibiting activities considered by a state to be contrary to public pol- 
icy by regulating the promotion by radio broadcasting." The "sub- 
stantial interest" standard is not a strict one.s2 In Posadas, the 
Supreme Court recognized Puerto Rico's substantial interest in the 
reduction of gambling, even though the regulation at  issue only 
restricted selected forms of advertising of casino gambling, while per- 
mitting advertising of other forms of gamb1ingaa3 
The third part of the Central Hudson test requires that a restric- 
tion on protected commercial speech directly advance the interest of 
the jurisdiction where the legislation is being challenged. If a prohi- 
bition provides only "ineffective or remote support" for such objec- 
tives, it fails under the First Amendment.'" 
The disputed section noted #I304 and 1307 (at footnote eight) 
constitutes ineffective means of reducing lottery participation by 
North Carolina residents, because they receive most of the radio, 
newspaper, and television communication from Virginia's local 
media. It is probably true that a relatively small number of North 
Carolina listeners may hear significantly less lottery advertising 
because of their allegiance to one station and that other North 
Carolinians may hear slightly less lottery advertising because they 
occasionally listen to Power 94. However, these possibilities do not 
sufficiently constitute "direct advancement" of the state's interest 
under the third part of Central Hudson test which makes it clear 
that "conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify 
silencing.. .promotional ad~ertising."'~ 
The application of section 1304 to Edge can only speculatively 
advance the goals of the state of North Carolina. Moreover, to the 
extent that that provision does reduce lottery participation by North 
Carolina residents, that reduction is necessarily so slight as to be 
kind of "remote" support rejected in Central Hudson as not "directly 
advancing" either interests of federalism or limitations on lottery 
saled6 Thus, the application of sections #I304 and 1307 to Edge's 
operation of Power 94 is constitutionally invalid. 
The final step and fourth part of the Central Hudson test is that a 
restriction on commercial speech may be no more extensive than nec- 
essary to further the "state's intere~t."'~ Central Hudson's "least 
restrictive alternative" is replaced by and interpreted according to the 
"narrowly tailored test of Board of Dustees of SUNY. Justice Scalia 
interpreted this part of the test as establishing "something short of a 
least restrictive standard, and described it as based on 'reasonable7 leg- 
islative necessitating a fit that is not necessarily perfect, 
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposi- 
tion but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that 
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means." 
The statutory scheme put in place is not unreasonable. 
Presumably in many instances, broadcasters located in non-lottery 
states will serve substantial populations in those states. Under such 
circumstances, there may be a "fit" between the statue and its objec- 
tives. Accordingly, these sections do pass under Board of Dustees of 
SUNTs relaxation of the fourth Central Hudson's standard. 
The question has been raised by commentators with regard to 
what they believe is an inconsistency between Justice Rehnquist's 
approach in Posadas and the standards of Central Hud~on.~' Based 
upon the dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, during recent hearings concern- 
ing section 1304 and related statutory provisions, a Justice 
Department representative stated that the Posadas analysis "cer- 
tainly contrasts with the approach in Central Hudson, and that "it 
remains to be seen whether the Court in future cases will take the 
established Central Hudson approach, or rely on Posadas' blank def- 
erence to the legi~lature."~ 
Two federal statutes and one federal case serve as the threshold 
for entering the next century in the continuing attempt to balance the 
interests of those seeking to advertise legalized gambling and those 
seeking to reduce it. The growth of gaming in the last century makes it 
a billion dollar industry and a source of revenue for state and local 
entities. With the exception of Indian gaming on reservations, some 49 
states offer some form of gaming they regulate; 39 states allow betting 
on horses; 33 states have legalized lotteries. Some 75 Indian tribes of 
the 300 existing in 20 states operate 150 gaming halls. Gaming 
extends along the shores of the U.S. and gaming interest extends to 68 
countries in addition to the U.S. The future of the gaming industry is 
inextricably linked to advertising. 
Recognizing that broadcast signals, as a technological matter, can- 
not be confined to political boundaries, this decade sees continuing tech- 
nological development in cable and satellite communication. In 1975, 
one exception to the prohibitive federal statutes was created permitting 
state-run lotteries to advertise in the state or in adjacent ones that also 
permitted lotteries. In 1988, the Charity Games Advertising 
Clarification Act removed federal restrictions on the advertising of legiti- 
mate lotteries and gambling activities in interstate commerce, whether 
conducted by public, private, or charitable interests. 
Gambling is a late blooming legal business; it was also late in 
gaining access to the courts to collect legal obligations, and late in 
gaining recognition of commercial speech protection. The Central 
Hudson test was modified to replace the least restrictive means by 
the Fox narrowly-tailored-means tests. Edge Broadcasting Corp. 
found protection for its broadcasting of lottery information and other 
advertising, even though it operated from Virginia where lotteries 
were legal, but broadcast from and into North Carolina where lotter- 
ies were not legal. The Supreme Court found that restriction of the 
statutes speculatively advanced the goals of the state of North 
Carolina, and the reduction was so slight as to be the kind of remote 
support not directly advancing either interests of federalism or limi- 
tations on lottery sales. The strong dissents in Posadas pose future 
questions as it remains to be seen whether the Court in future cases 
will take the established approach in Central Hudson or rely on 
Posadas' blank deference to the legislature. 
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